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Abstract 
This work   tried  to detect  the existence  of  a  relationship  between  the  
graphic signals  - or patterns - observed  day by day  in the  Brazilian  
stock  market  and  the trends which  happen after  these  signals, within a 
period  of  8  years, for a number of  securities. The  results  obtained  
from  this  study  show  evidence of   the existence   of     such   a    
relationship, suggesting the validity of the Technical Analysis as an 
instrument to  predict the trend of security prices in the Brazilian stock 
market within that period.  
(Keywords: Efficient Markets, Behavioral Finance, Technical Analysis) 
Introduction 
For a long time the Efficient Markets Hypothesis - EMH has been an underpinning of 
the finance theory. However, many critics there appeared stressing that its assumptions 
did not correspond to the reality of markets. It is still a controversial theme. EMH 
denies the utility of technical analysis. 
Not so long ago Behavioral Finance had its dawning, announcing that a new approach 
should be given to finance and economics: people, and their behavior, also matter, not 
only numbers. Also, it came to shed a new light on technical analysis, an instrument 
that, above all, reflects investor’s behavior. 
And then, there is Technical Analysis (TA). 
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This study does not intend to be a course on TA. Rather, we’ll introduce concepts 
necessary to understanding the tests made and the conclusions obtained.  
There are several kinds of TA: Bar Charts, Candlesticks, Point & Figure, Elliott Waves. 
The present study considers only bar charts. 
We should stress, however, that TA is an empirical process, i.e., the results come 
through observation. It is not an exact science, where concepts may be exactly proved or 
demonstrated. 
 
1. THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS - EMH 
A market is called efficient when prices always fully reflect available information.1 An 
efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing information. The prices 
of securities, at any time, are based on “correct” evaluation of all information available 
at that time.2 In an efficient market there is a huge number of rational profit-maximizers 
in active competition trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and 
the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.3 
Fama4 defines 3 forms of efficiency: The weak form, the semi-strong form and the 
strong form:  In the weak form the information set is historical prices. If the market is 
efficient in the weak form, no investor is supposed to earn excess (or extraordinary) 
returns using historical data, once that information is already reflected in prices. Excess 
returns are profits earned by whatever strategy other than the buy and hold strategy and 
bigger than the profit obtained by this latter strategy. The semi-strong form considers 
information  publicly available, like announcements of annual earnings, stock splits, etc. 
By the same reason, in this form of efficiency an investor couldn’t earn excess returns. 
If the market is efficient in the strong form an investor can’t earn excess returns with 
information publicly held or not, even not posted yet.  
                                                           
1
 Fama (1970), 383 
2
 Fama (1976), 133 
3
 Fama (1995), 4 
4
 Fama (1970), 383 
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Fama admits, however, that there is evidence of market inefficiency in the strong form 
sense, due to the action of market makers, specialists who have a monopoly power over 
important information and can use it to turn it into profit.5 
Regarding market efficiency and technical analysis Fama says that “chart reading, 
though perhaps an interesting pastime, is of no real value to the stock market 
investor”.6 
The assumption of the EMH that prices reflect all information is criticized by Grossman 
& Stiglitz.7 In their opinion, there are costs involved in obtaining information that 
influence transactions. The authors still argue “(…) because information is costly, 
prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is available, since if it did, those 
who spent resources to obtain it would receive no compensation. There is a 
fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and 
the incentives to acquire information.” In other words, there is an informational 
asymmetry. 
Siglitz still argues8 “The most fundamental reason why markets with imperfect 
information differ from those in which it does (sic) is that actions (including choices) 
convey information, market participants know this, and this affects their behavior.” 
An example of the inefficiency of markets is given by Basu9, in a study about the 
predictive power of low P/E ratios. During the period April 1957-March 1971, the low 
P/E portfolios seem to have, on average, earned higher absolute and risk-adjusted rates 
of return than the high  P/E securities. “The results suggest a violation in the hypothesis 
that (…) security price behavior is consistent with the EMH (…)  suggesting that P/E 
ratio information was not “fully reflected” in security prices in as rapid a manner as 
postulated by the semi-strong form of the EMH.” 
                                                           
5
 Fama (1970), 398. 
6
 Fama (1965). 34. Fama uses the term chartist theory with reference to Dow theory, the granddad of 
technical analysis. Chart reading or chart analysis may be understood as technical analysis. 
7
 Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), 393-408. 
8
 Stiglitz (2001), 485. 
9
 Basu (1977), 663-682. 
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Another example of the predictive power of the P/E ratio is given by Shiller10. 
Analyzing the market value of the S&P Composite Index on January, 2000 and dividing 
it by the 10 years moving average of returns he found a P/E ratio of 44.3, much higher 
than the 32.6 ratio in September, 1929, on the brink of the crash of the market on 
Tuesday October 29, 1929. Only as reference, the average P/E ratio of the American 
stock exchange from 1871 to 1990 had been 15.11 
Shiller  was then heralding a sign of danger12: the stock exchange was again on the 
brink of the burst of a speculative bubble that was being observed in the American stock 
market. 
And he was right, the crisis was near. On April, 14 that year the Nasdaq plummeted, 
with a drop of 5.66% and the S&P, 5.78%13. On April 17 the drop had reached 37% 
from its highest level on March the same year. 
There happened another inefficiency of the market, and the P/E ratio was right.       
Once again, showing that the semi-strong form of efficiency of the market had failed! 
Public data, through the P/E ratio, showed it is possible not only to have excess returns 
but also to avoid losses.  
Information plays a very important role in the concept of the EMH. Bernstein14 
mentions the Victorian concept of rational behavior that “measurement always 
dominates intuition: rational people make choices on the basis of information rather 
than on the basis of whim, emotion or habit. Once they have analyzed all the available 
information, they make decisions in accord with well-defined preferences.”  
Black shows that it isn’t always true,  arguing that “people sometimes trade on noise as 
if it were information…. However, noise trading is essential to the existence of liquid 
                                                           
10
 Shiller (2000), 8. 
11
 Newspaper  O Estado de São Paulo, 04/15/00 - Brazil 
12
 Shiller (2000), 3-14 
13
  Newspaper  O Estado de São Paulo, 04/15/00 - Brazil 
14
  Bernstein (1998), 246. 
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markets. People don’t know they are trading on noise. They think they are trading on 
information. Noise is the information that hasn’t arrived yet15“ 
In Electronics, noise is a disturbance superimposed on a useful signal that tends to cloud 
its informational content.16 Or, “in its most wide sense, noise is any signal present in a 
communication channel, other than the desired signal.17 
Or, as Bernstein puts it, “noise is badly analyzed information, misinformation or 
hunch18” 
Regarding markets efficiency there are 2 interesting Warren Buffett’s quotations: 
• "I'd be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were always efficient" 
Fortune April 3, 1995 
• "Investing in a market where people believe in efficiency is like playing bridge 
with someone who has been told it doesn't do any good to look at the cards." 
http://oldprof.typepad.com June 27, 2006. 
For more critics about EMH, see Haugen (1995) and Shleifer (2000). 
 
2. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
Behavioral Finance is considered one of the most controversial branches in the New 
Finance, beside the Fractal Markets Hypothesis (FMH) and the Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN).19 
Behavioral Finance is a blend of Psychology and Finance, that seeks to explain the 
(ir)rationality of the decision maker, such as an investor trying to pick one among 
several stocks to invest.  
                                                           
15
  Black (1986). 529; 534. 
16
 IEEE (1977), 439. 
17
 Bell (1971), 49. 
18
  Bernstein (1993) 
19
  Ongkrutaraksa (1996). 
6 
 
Thaler20 arguments that “Most of the time, the behavior of both rational and less than 
fully rational agents matter. This means that it is no longer possible to have complete 
confidence in the usual approach, which is to characterize optimal behavior and then 
assume this behavior is universal”. He thinks of behavioral finance as simply “open-
minded finance”. 
 2.1 Risk Perception 
What is risk? Risk may be defined as the degree of uncertainty about an event.21 Or risk 
is the probability of the occurrence of failures, where failures are events that keep goals 
from being achieved, and successes are those that don’t. 22  
“People respond to the hazards they perceive23. But different people perceive risks in 
different ways24. 
Risk perception leads to judgements, often based on heuristic principles. Heuristics are 
kind of short-cuts that simplify complex reasoning. The problem is that for the most part 
heuristics turn reasoning so simple that they lead to errors. 
The main heuristics are Representativeness, Availability and Adjustment and Anchoring 
“In the representativeness case, probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is 
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B. (…) This approach to 
the judgement of probability leads to serious errors because similarity, or 
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgements of 
probability.25 In many situations people assess the probability of an event or the 
frequency of a class by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to 
mind. This is the case of the heuristic called availability. Oftentimes people make 
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. This 
                                                           
20
  Thaler (1993). xvi; xvii 
21
 Solomon & Pringle (1981, apud Securato 1996), 21. 
22
  Securato (1996), 28 
23
  Slovic et al, (1980, in Kahneman et al 2001), 463 
24
  Weber & Hsee (1988), 1205-1217. 
25
 Kahneman & Tversky (1974, in Kahneman et al 2001), 4 
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reference, or starting point is, many times, wrong, leading to insufficient adjustments. 
This is the case of adjustment and anchoring26 which is, in our opinion, the most 
harmful heuristic; for instance, when the price of a security starts to fall and after some 
time, with prices still falling, an investor decides to buy in order to improve the average 
price. That proceeding usually leads to losses. 
 2.2 The Prospect Theory27 
In our opinion that is the most important point of Behavioral Finance. 
Imagine 2 mountains, one much bigger than the other. The bigger one should seem 
always bigger, it should be an invariance. But that is not what happens. Suppose you are 
driving down a road and you are close to the smaller mountain, and the bigger mountain 
is very far away. The impression you have is that the mountain that is near is bigger 
than the one that is very far. That is a failure of invariance.28 
That kind of distortion often happens when you change the framing of a question: 
different ways of proposing a question lead to different answers, or, different frames of 
presenting a problem may lead to different decision making. 
In a nutshell, people are risk averse in choices involving sure gains and risk seeking in 
choices involving sure losses. 
People react to the risk they perceive. 
People don’t perceive risk in the same way 
People don’t perceive risk at the same time. 
Losses loom bigger than gains. 
 
                                                           
26
 Idem, 14. 
27
 Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
28
 Bernstein (1998), 269-283. 
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3. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
 3.1. Introduction 
What is Technical Analysis? TA may be considered a mix or a combination of art and 
science, according to the vision of many authors. “It is one approach to marketing 
forecasting based on a study of the past, human psychology…)”29. It is the science of 
recording, usually in graphic form the (…) price history of a certain stock then deducing 
the probable future trend.30 History repeats itself, and prices move in trends. Technical 
Analysis is based on following trends.31 It is the study of repeating patterns which 
reflect investors’ waves of greed and fear.32 
 3.2. Dow Theory 
TA, as it is known today, stems from Dow Theory, which can be considered TA’s 
granddad. Charles Dow and Edward Jones founded the Dow Jones & Co. in 1882, in 
order to post stock prices and economic news from the New York stock market. Dow 
was the founder of the Wall Street Journal, and they were the journal first editors33. 
Dow discovered that stock prices do not move in a chaotic way, but rather, follow 
trends established by the stock market as a whole.34 The first publication of a stock 
market average happened on July 3, 1884, and that index included only 11 stocks, nine 
of which were railroad companies.35  
Charles Dow never wrote a book himself, but his ideas, known through his editorials, 
were organized by William Peter Hamilton in his book The Stock Market Barometer  
and first mentioned as Dow Theory by Samuel Armstrong Nelson in his book The ABC 
                                                           
29
 Murphy (1986), xviii. 
30
 Edwards & Magee (2001), 4. 
31
 Goldberg & Nitsch (2001), 6 
32
 Noronha (1995), 1. 
33
 Hamilton (1922), 4. 
34
 Leite & Sanvicente (1995), 12. 
35
 Murphy (1986), 24. 
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of Stock Speculation. Hamilton’s editorials are reproduced in Rhea’s book The Dow 
Theory. These 3 books were edited after Dow’s death. 
Among Dow’s tenets there is one that, in our opinion, is the most important of all and 
says: a trend is still valid until a signal of its reversal is confirmed. In other words, 
after a trend has started it is more likely to continue or keep its direction than to 
reverse.36  
 3.3 The Bar Chart 
The bar37 in the bar chart (fig. 1) represents a trading period, i.e., a day, a week, one 
hour, one minute, 5 minutes and so on 
 
        
        
    Fig.1  THE BAR 
OPEN – the price of the first trade in the period,  
CLOSE – the price of the last trade in the period 
HIGH – the highest price in the period 
LOW – the lowest price in the period 
 
                                                           
36
 Murphy (1986), 3; 30. Rhea (2002), 76. 
37
 Achelis (2001), 9. 
 
HIGH 
LOW 
CLOSE 
    OPEN 
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The number Three 
One of the features of  TA is the importance of the number 3, as we shall see along the 
study. It’s kind of a pattern, to be observed in many situations. 
Tops and Bottoms  
In the stock market there is a saying that goes “buy cheap and sell dear”. But how much 
is cheap and how much is dear? To buy cheap means you should buy at the bottom; and 
to sell dear, that you should sell at the top. If it weren’t by pure luck, you’ll only know 
that a point is an extreme, top or bottom, after you have passed it. You’ll only know that 
you reached the top of the mountain when you start to descend the other side. In terms 
of  TA it means that to confirm that one bar is the top it is necessary to have at least 3 
bars going down after it; or that it is the bottom, at least 3 bars going up after it. See 
fig.2 and 3. 
          TOP or High 
                
   Fig. 2 – Confirmation of a top or a high 
       BOTTOM or Low 
     
   Fig. 3 – Confirmation of a bottom or a low 
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Trendlines 
Trendlines indicate the main direction of prices evolution, and can be Up Trendlines or 
Down Trendlines (see fig. 4 and 5). 
 
                    
 
                             Fig. 4 – Up Trendline 
 
To trace an up trendline you need 2 lows (bars A and B), low B > low A, separated by 
at least 3 bars.  
             
   Fig. 5 – Down Trendline 
To trace a down trendline you need 2 highs (bars C and D), high C > high D, separated 
by at least 3 bars. 
Thus the definition of a trend uses to take at least 8 days. 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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Supports and Resistances 
Support is a limit below which prices (or points) don’t fall in movements above an up 
trendline (fig. 6A) or above a horizontal line in sideways movements (fig. 6B). 
 
                 Fig. 6 - Supports 
Resistance is a limit that is not passed in up movements below a downtrend (fig. 7A) or 
below a horizontal line in sideways movements (fig. 7B).        
 
 
                                                    Fig. 7 – Resistances 
 
A 
B 
A 
B 
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Trend Reversal – Breaking Resistance/Support levels38    
To revert, a trend must break the resistance/support level by at least 3%, i.e., the closing 
of the bar on that day should be at least 3% above/below that level. If it doesn’t reach 
3% on a single day you just add the ups/downs in the two following days. The 
breakthrough is also valid if there are 3 bars going up/down after the crossing point 
even if the percentage is less than 3%, as shown below. Three days or 3% apply 
indistinctly to horizontal lines or up/down trendlines.  
 
     Fig. 8 - Breakthrough 
Moving Averages 
A moving average (MA) is kind of a moving window where you can see a fixed number 
of prices. For instance, in an arithmetic moving average (AMA) of 5 days you add the 
prices of the last 5 days and divide the result by 5. Each new day you include this most 
recent day and discard the first, 5 days ago.  
In a brief explanation, its value is given by the formula  
                                                   
Where pi  is the price p on day i, and n is the number of days considered (window size). 
                                                           
38
 See: Noronha (1995), 54.  Murphy (1986), 66-67; 74. Edwards & Magee (2001), 57. Pring (2002), 73.  
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Moving averages behave like resistance/support areas. When prices cross a MA it’s a 
signal that the trend is starting to revert. When prices cross above a MA and prices and 
MA spread out, confirming, it’s a buy signal. When they cross below and prices and the 
MA spread out confirming, it’s a sell signal. 
The most usual MAs are MA 21 days (representing 1 month, usually 21 working days); 
MA 233 days (representing one year, usually 252 working days).39 
 MA 233 usually is the most important resistance/support level. 
4. THE RESEARCH 
In order to show the validity of technical analysis in the Brazilian Stock Market through 
a statistical analysis of the occurrence of graphic signals (patterns) and its relation with 
the subsequent trends, this study considered the day to day evolution of prices of 10 
securities – the BOVESPA index and 9 stocks from the index: Petrobras PN, Eletrobras 
PN, Vale PNA, Bradesco PN, Cemig PN, Itau PN, Usiminas PNA, Siderurgica 
Nacional ON e Tubarao PN, within the 8 years period from 1995/01/02 to 2002/12/30. 
The patterns considered were:.  
Up movements: up trendlines, breaking of down trendlines, breaking of horizontal 
resistances, double bottoms, flags, channel, high fan principles, symmetrical triangle, 
rectangle, head and shoulders, bullish pennants. 
Down movements: down trendlines, breaking of up trendlines, breaking of horizontal 
supports, down fan principles, symmetrical triangle, head and shoulders, flags, bearish 
pennants, double tops 
5. METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this study is to check the validity of the patterns used by the technical 
analysis. For instance: I buy, for a certain price, a stock in the next day an up trendline 
has been confirmed40 and sell it the next day its breaking is confirmed41. Once the 
                                                           
39
 Those numbers of days come from the sequence of Fibonacci; see Brown (2008) and most of the            
references already mentioned. 
40
 See p.11 
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selling price is bigger than the buying price, I’ll have a profit. Therefore, the trendline is 
true. Otherwise, it’s false. After selling, the process starts all over again. Let us make it 
clear that the trend – that is established after its confirmation 3 days after the second low 
or high, constitutes the pattern itself. 
This process was used on a daily basis, starting in the first day of the period – 95/01/02 
until its last day, 02/12/30 and repeated for each one of the securities above mentioned, 
all patterns were registered and analyzed (see Table 1, below). The total was tested 
through Chi Square test, showing statistical relevance at 0.5% level of significance. 
6. THE TESTS 
 
          Table 1 – Results (Ups and Downs, Consolidated) 
The results in table 1 show that 75.2% of the total patterns obtained were true, 
compared with only 24.8% false, thus indicating the reliability of technical analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
41
 See p.13 
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Table 1 also shows that the first four patterns – up trendline, breaking of a down 
trendline, breaking of an up trendline and down trendline, the most frequent patterns, 
account for nearly 86% of the total of patterns and are the most significant patterns. 
Results also tested through Chi Square test, showing statistical relevance at 0.5% level 
of significance. 
 
                                 Table 2 – Relevance of the most important patterns 
Table 3 shows a very interesting point, that each security has its “own personality”. 
Bradesco PN presented the highest percentage of true patterns, 88.3%. It means that 
whenever an up pattern was confirmed in Bradesco PN chart an investor should buy it 
with a chance of 88.3%, on average, of making money. In spite of also presenting a high 
percentage, Usiminas PNA is the worst among all of them, with 68.3% of true patterns.  
“All stocks vary with the market as a whole, but each responds to information in its own 
way”42 
 
                    Table 3 – Results per security 
                                                           
42
  Bernstein (1993), 258. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this research was to show the validity of technical analysis in the Brazilian 
stock market through the study of graphic patterns detected within the 8 years 
observation period, in the selected securities. 
Results show that from the 840 identified patterns, 632 were true (75.2%) and 208 
(24.8%), false, as to validate the following trends, i.e., this study has shown that true 
patterns constitute the most of the patterns encountered, thus validating the efficiency of 
technical analysis, and so suggesting inefficiencies of the market and contradicting the 
EMH in its weak form when it affirms that historical data are already reflected in prices, 
also showing that the affirmation “chart reading, though perhaps an interesting 
pastime, is of no real value to the stock market investor” may not correspond to reality.  
Stiglitz won the Economy Nobel prize in 2001 with the theory of Informational 
Asymmetry (see p. 3). Technical Analysis is costly information, you have to pay for it, 
what causes an asymmetry. 
Kahneman won the Economy Nobel prize in 2002 with the theory of Behavioral 
Finance. Technical Analysis reflects behavior.  
These two Academy awards reinforce the importance of Technical Analysis. 
Basu (see p. 3) indicated inefficiencies in the EMH in its semi-strong form. 
Fama himself admitted inefficiencies in the EMH in its strong form. 
This study thus indicates the strengthening of behavioral finance, the questioning of 
efficient markets hypothesis and the validity of technical analysis. 
 
"I'd be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were always efficient". 
 Warren Buffet,Fortune April 3, 1995 
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